Jean-Pierre Benoît

Professor of Economics; Fellow of the British Academy

BA (Yale) PhD (Stanford)

Professor Jean-Pierre Benoît is a fellow of the British Academy and a fellow of the Econometric Society. He is also a winner of the Best Teacher Award in the EMBA programme. He is an expert in microeconomic theory, industrial organisation, game theory, and law and economics. His research has been published in leading economics, political science and law journals, and encompasses a range of subjects, including auctions, voting theory, dynamic competition, entry deterrence, affirmative action, overconfidence and apparent behavioural biases. 

Professor Benoît is currently Chair of the Economics subject Area. Before joining the school, he was Professor of Economics and Professor of Law at New York University.

  • Game theory
  • Auctions
  • Law and economics
  • Voting
  • Social organisations and industrial organisation


Belief Elicitation When More Than Money Matters: Controlling for ‘Control'

Benoit J-P; Dubra J; Romagnoli G

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2022 Vol 14:3 p 837-888


Apparent bias: what does attitude polarization show?

Benoit J-P; Dubra J

International Economic Review 2019 Vol 60:4 p 1675-1703


Investing to cooperate : theory and experiment

Benoit J-P; Galbiati R; Henry E

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2017 Vol 144 p 1-17


Does the better-than-average effect show that people are overconfident? Two experiments

Benoit J-P; Dubra J; Moore D A

Journal of the European Economic Association 2014 Vol 13:2 p 293-329


On the problem of prevention

Benoit J-P; Dubra J

International Economic Review 2013 Vol 54:3 p 787-805


Apparent overconfidence

Benoit J P; Dubra J

Econometrica 2011 Vol 79:5 p 1591-1625


Only a dictatorship is efficient

Benoit JP

Games and Economic Behavior 2010 March Vol 70:2 p 261-270


Nash implementation without no-veto power

Benoit J-P; Ok E A

Games and Economic Behavior 2008 Vol 64:1 p 51-67


Delay aversion

Benoit J-P; Ok E

Theoretical Economics 2007 March Vol 2:1 p 71-113

On combining implementable social choice rules

Benoit J-P; Ok E; Sanver R

Games and Economic Behavior 2007 Vol 60:1 p 20-30


Information revelation in auctions

Benoit J-P; Dubra J

Games and Economic Behavior 2006 Vol 57:2 p 181-205

Maskin's theorem with limited veto power

Benoit J-P; Ok E

Games and Economic Behavior 2006 Vol 55:2 p 331-339


Why do good cops defend bad cops?

Benoit J-P; Dubra J

International Economic Review 2004 Aug Vol 45:3 p 787-809


Game theoretic analyses of legal rules and institutions

Benoit J-P; Kornhauser L

in Aumann R J and Hart S eds., Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 3, Elsevier North-Holland, 2002

Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted

Benoit J-P

Journal of Economic Theory 2002 Feb Vol 102:2 p 421-436


Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders

Benoit J-P; Krishna V J

Review of Economic Studies 2001 Jan Vol 68:234 p 155-179


Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a simple proof

Benoit J-P

Economics Letters 2000 Dec Vol 69:3 p 319-322

Simple proof of the Biggard-Satterthwaite theorem

Benoit J-P

Economics Letters 2000 p 319-322


Color blind is not color neutral: testing differences and affirmative action

Benoit J-P

Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1999 Jul Vol 15:2 p 378-400

On the assumption of separable assembly preferences

Benoit J-P; Kornhauser L

Social Choice and Welfare 1999 Vol 16:3 p 429-439


Nucleolus is contested-garment-consistent: a direct proof

Benoit J-P

Journal of Economic Theory 1997 Nov Vol 77:1 p 192-196


Assembly-based preferences, candidate-based procedures and the voting rights act

Benoit J-P; Kornhauser L

Southern California Law Review 1995 Vol 68 p 1503-1544

Crime, punishment and social expenditure

Benoit J-P; Osborne M

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 1995 Vol 151 p 326-347


Social choice in a representative democracy

Benoit J-P; Kornhauser L

American Political Science Review 1994 Mar Vol 88:1 p 185-192


Renegotiation in finitely repeated games

Benoit J-P; Krishna V

Econometrica 1992 Mar Vol 61:2 p 303-323

Scoring reversals: a major league dilemma

Benoit J-P

Social Choice and Welfare 1992 Jun Vol 9:2 p 89-97

Unsafe havens

Benoit J-P; Kornhauser L

University of Chicago Law Review 1992 Vol 59 p 1421-1464


Entry deterrence and dynamic competition: the role of capacity reconsidered

Benoit J-P; Krishna V

International Journal of Industrial Organization 1991 Dec Vol 9:4 p 477-495


Non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma

Benoit J-P

Mathematical Social Sciences 1988 Dec Vol 16:3 p 281-287


Dynamic duopoly: prices and quantities

Benoit J-P; Krishna V

Review of Economic Studies 1987 Jan Vol 54:177 p 23-35

Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games

Benoit J-P; Krishna V

International Journal of Game Theory 1987 Sep Vol 16:3 p 197-204


Financially constrained entry in a game with incomplete information

Benoit J-P

Rand Journal of Economics 1985 Winter Vol 15:4 p 490-499

Finitely repeated games

Benoit J-P; Krishna V

Econometrica 1985 Jul Vol 53:4 p 905-922

Innovation and imitation in a duopoly

Benoit J-P

Review of Economic Studies 1985 Jan Vol 52:168 p 99-106


A theory of rational attitude polarization

Benoit J-P; Dubra J

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Teaching portfolio

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